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Abstract: This paper examines a model of financial and exchange crises with balance-sheet 
effects by explicitly taking account of wealth accumulation and external equilibrium 
condition. We have found that, in a general equilibrium analysis, there are two stationary 
equilibria. Since foreign debt is always zero at these equilibria, financial crises in emerging 
market economies cannot be interpreted as jumps between equilibria but between trajectories 
leading to one equilibrium or another one. The mechanisms of financial crises due to 
monsoon or spill-over effects are also analysed in this framework.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In the aftermath of 1997 Asian financial crisis, there was much controversy among 
macroeconomic researchers about its origin and nature. A decade later, economists have 
learned much about the relation between financial and exchange crises. Two generations of 
currency crisis models have been developed before the 1997 Asian turmoil and are pertinent 
in explaining other particular crisis in the 1990s. The first focused on budgetary deficits and 
the effect of its continuing monetary financing (Krugman, 1979; Flood and Garber, 1984). 
The second (Obstfeld, 1994; Sachs et al., 1996), explained the crisis as the result of a conflict 
between a nominal exchange rate peg and the desire of pursuing an expansionary monetary 
policy, leading to the existence of multiple equilibria.  
In the major crisis countries of Asia, however, neither of these stories has much relevance. 
In terms of conventional fiscal measures, the governments of the distressed economies were 
in quite good shape at the beginning of 1997. While growth had slowed and some signs of 
excess capacity appeared in 1996, none of them faced the kind of clear trade-off between 
employment and exchange rate stability.  
The third-generation models of currency crisis were then developed in order to answer the 
particular questions raised during this Asian crisis. Many of these models have in common the 
idea that the crisis should be seen as a result of a shock that is amplified by what Bernanke et 
al. (1999) have called a financial accelerator mechanism. The basic story is similar: Since 
firms’ assets and liabilities are denominated in domestic and foreign currency respectively, 
real currency depreciation can have a large effect on output if it affects the credit access of 
some subset of agents; moreover this effect on output may in turn affect the exchange rate, 
further amplifying the shock and causing it to persist. Most have argued that the core of the 
problem lies in the banking system. In Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1999), moral-hazard-
driven lending could have provided a sort of hidden subsidy to investment, which collapsed 
when visible losses led governments to withdraw their implicit guarantees. Considering the 
Asian crisis as a problem of international financial fragility and liquidity, Chang and Velasco 
(2001)
1 suggest that currency crises are the by-product of a bank run. The later is modelled a 
la Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and hence as a self-fulfilling loss of confidence that forces 
financial intermediaries to liquidate their investments prematurely. Krugman (1999) has 
sketched the transfer problem as another way of explaining the Asian crisis: foreign currency 
                                                 
1 The model of Chang and Velasco (2001) is not strictly a financial accelerator model. In fact, the effect on the 
borrowing capacity of the firm sector is indirect – it comes from a fall in the lending capacity of the banking 
sector.   2
debts and firms’ leveraged financing make the domestic economy fragile and prone to crisis. 
In these models, there are multiple equilibria with the crisis brought on by a pure shift in 
expectations, leading to possible jump from high investment equilibrium to one with low or 
zero investment. 
Meanwhile, in some models which introduce also balance sheet effects and leverage 
constraint, there is an adverse real shock that gets amplified. Aghion et al. (2001, 2004a) 
model a two-period multiple equilibrium economy in which the presence of sticky prices and 
foreign currency liabilities are part of a story of endogenous currency crises. In Mendoza 
(2002), a mismatch between the denomination of debt and income exacerbates financial crises 
in emerging markets. In Kim and Lee (2002), firms are motivated to over-invest because of 
government subsidies and are vulnerable to adverse shocks which increase rapidly the 
expected loan-to-collateral value ratio. In Aghion et al. (2004b), firms face credit constraints 
with the constraint being tighter at lower level of financial development. A basic implication 
of the model is that economies at an intermediate level of financial development are more 
unstable than either very developed or very underdeveloped economies. This is true both in 
the sense that temporary shocks have large and persistent effects and that these economies can 
exhibit cycles. In a small open economy model with sticky price and balance sheet effects, 
Cook (2004), shows that a monetary policy induced devaluation leads to a persistent 
contraction in output. 
However, in modelling Asian financial crisis as jump from high investment equilibrium to 
low (or zero) investment equilibrium, one fails to take account of the characteristics of an 
emerging market economy and hence to explain the following recovery. In fact, the persistent 
contractionary effects of devaluation are not found before and after the 1997 Asian crisis.
2 For 
example, South Korea saw its GDP growth rebounding from − 6.7 percent in 1998 to +10.9 
percent in 1999. However, after currency devaluation, the level of GDP can remain 
permanently below its initial trend,
3 suggesting that the shocks underlying a currency crisis 
are persistent (Hong and Tornell, 2005). 
                                                 
2 Empirically, Upadhyaya and Upadhyaya (1999) find that, with few exceptions, currency devaluation in Asian 
countries fails to make any effect on output over any length of time - short run, intermediate run, or long run. 
Kim and Ying (2007), using the pre-1997 crisis data and the trade-weighted exchange rate, find no evidence of 
contractionary devaluations. In fact, currency devaluation appears strongly expansionary in several countries. 
But their exercise suggests also that the crisis period was indeed different. 
3 This can also be explained by the shift, induced by violent shocks, in the behaviours of international lenders as 
well as that of domestic firms, leading to less lending (or borrowing) and hence less investment and lower 
growth rate of the GDP.   3
Moreover, most of these models focusing on balance sheet effects do not give enough 
attention to the rise of international interest rate. Kwack (2000) shows, with panel data on 
seven countries in Asia—Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and 
Thailand - for the 1995 through 1997 period, that the 3-month LIBOR interest rate and 
nonperforming loan ratios of banks are found to be the major determinants of the Asian 
financial crisis. The corporate leverage ratio also plays an important role since it explains the 
nonperforming loan ratios. 
In this paper, we extend the model of Krugman (1999), in what follows Krugman, in 
taking account of wealth accumulation and external equilibrium condition. In analysing the 
dynamics of the economy, we find that a financial crisis can be considered as a jump from an 
unstable trajectory to a stable (or unstable) trajectory among many others. In effect, emerging 
market economies are in a process of capital and wealth accumulation so that the state where 
a crisis starts is necessarily a temporary equilibrium which, affected by some adverse shocks 
(such as a rise in foreign interest rate) or contagious financial crisis in neighbour countries, 
becomes a disequilibrium violating some basic financial constraints. Preventive devaluation 
as suggested by Miller (1998) is pertinent in avoiding excessive increase in foreign currency 
debt and subsequent financial crisis. The durable contractionary effects of devaluation can not 
appear in a dynamic analysis of emerging market model except when foreign currency debt is 
long term or/and too high.  
In the section 2, we present the model that leads to a reduced dynamic system of 
investment and foreign debt. In the section after, we describe the steady state and the static 
and dynamic properties of multiple equilibria. In the section 4, we discuss factors which could 
be at the origin of financial fragility and crisis. The dilemma of stabilization under nominal 
exchange rate peg and some policy implications are respectively discussed in the sections 5 
and 6. We conclude in the section 7. 
 
2. The model  
We extend the small open-economy model of Krugman, which does not include the 
money, to a multi-period model. 
 
2.1. Basic equations 
The small open economy model is described by the following equations:  
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with  t y  denotes the output,  t K  the stock of physical capital,  t L  the labour,  t I  the investment, 
t C  the consumption,  t p  the real exchange rate (or the relative price of foreign goods),  t X  the 
exportations,  t W  the net wealth of domestic entrepreneurs,  t D  the domestic currency 
denominated debt,  t F  the foreign currency denominated debt,  t r  the domestic real interest 
rate and 
*
t r  the foreign real interest rate. Some variables such as  t y ,  t K ,  t I ,  t C ,  t W  and  t D  
are measured in terms of domestic goods while others, i.e.  t X  and  t F , are in terms of foreign 
goods. The time index “t” indicates that they are flux variable ( t y ,  t L ,  t I  and  t C ) or prices 
( t p ,  t r  and 
*
t r ) of the current period, or stock variables at the end of the current period ( t W , 
t F  and  t D ) or of the last period  ( t K ).   
Equation (1) represents the production function, assumed to be Cobb-Douglas, of the 
small open economy that produces a single good each period using capital and labour. Capital 
is created through investment and it is assumed that it lasts only one period, so that this 
period’s capital is equal to last period’s investment. This assumption allows putting aside 
Diamond-Dybvig-type concerns over maturity mismatch between capital and foreign debt. 
According to Krugman, because a share μ  of investment falls on foreign goods, the price 
index for investment relative to that of domestic output is 
μ
t p ; the return on investment of last   5
period in terms of domestic goods of current period is therefore deflated by a price index 
μ μ
t t p p
−
−1 . In terms of modelling, it is equivalent to define  . 1 1
μ μ −
− − = t t t t p p I K
4   
Equation (2) describes the market clearing condition for domestic goods. The functions of 
demand for consumption and investment are derived under the simple assumption that the 
residents of this economy are divided into two distinct classes. Workers, who receive a share 
α − 1  of domestic income, lack access to the capital market and therefore spend all their 
income within each period. Entrepreneurs, who are assumed to be single-mindedly engaged in 
wealth accumulation, saving and investing all their income, create and own domestic capital 
until they have exhausted domestic investment opportunities. After that, they will spend their 
surplus of their revenue over investment.
5 The domestic and foreign goods, with a unitary 
elasticity of substitution, are not perfect substitutes. A share  μ − 1  of both consumption and 
investment is spent on domestic goods, μ  on imports. The rest of the world is large and 
spends a negligible fraction of its income on domestic goods. We assume, following 
Krugman, that the value of domestic exports in terms of foreign goods is fixed with  X Xt = , 
i.e. the foreign elasticity of substitution is also unitary. 
From equation (2), the domestic real exchange rate is expressed as in equation (3). 
According to the later, the higher is investment, the lower the real exchange rate. The 
relationship between real exchange rate and investment is complicated by the presence of 
price index in the production function as indicated in equation (5). 
As shown by inequality (4), the ability of domestic entrepreneurs to invest is limited by 
their wealth in the way of Bernanke et al. (1999). Lenders impose a limit on leverage, justified 
by microeconomic and financial motives such as risk of insolvability and asymmetric 
information. Hence, entrepreneurs can borrow at most  ) 1 ( λ + times their initial wealth.  
Equation (5) shows that the return of domestic investment is determined by the marginal 
productivity of capital. 
                                                 
4 Krugman (1999) writes 
μ −
− = p I K t t 1 , which represents a special case of the present model. In fact, Krugman 
makes a partial equilibrium analysis of his model in adopting an implicit assumption, i.e.  1 1 = − t p .  
5 We introduce this assumption to close the small open-economy model. Otherwise, these entrepreneurs can 
accumulate an infinite amount of wealth. This assumption might not be plausible one for describing some 
emerging economies having sufficiently accumulated capital. As illustrated by recent international developments 
of South Korean firms, ambitious and innovative entrepreneurs might be tempted to invest on international 
financial market and in industrial projects in other countries. For other manners of closing the model, see 
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003). 
   6
According to inequality (6), entrepreneurs will not borrow beyond the point at which the 
real return on domestic investment, determined by equation (5), equals that on foreign 
investment. It is similar to uncovered interest rates parity (UIRP), which compares the return 
that can be achieved with domestic capital (by converting a unity of foreign goods into 
domestic goods at the real exchange rate  t p , then converting the next-period return back into 
foreign goods at  1 + t p ) and the rate of return of foreign asset 
*
t r .   
Equation (7) imposes that investment cannot be negative.  
Entrepreneurs own a wealth which is defined by equation (8). They hold all domestic 
capital and receive a share α  of domestic revenue that will not be spent for consumption. The 
income accruing to capital within the current period ( t y α ) also represents the value of 
domestic capital since it lasts only one period. At aggregate level, they owe debt to 
international lenders with the “currency composition” of debt taken as a given. 
Equation (9) describes the evolution of foreign debt contracted by domestic entrepreneurs. 
All investment not financed by their wealth is financed by foreign debt. In other words, it 
represents the balance-sheet constraint of these entrepreneurs. 
Equation (10) is the external equilibrium condition or the balance of payments, which is 
equivalent to the combination of equations (2), (8) and (9) under flexible exchange rate 
regime where the balance of payments exhibits neither deficit nor surplus, i.e.  0 = ee B . Under 
fixed exchange rate regime, this equivalence is valid only at steady state since otherwise,  ee B  
can be positive, null or negative.  
The last two equations represent the logic extension of Krugman’s model. They are 
important to our understanding of the underlying features of a crisis prone economy.  
In the following, we assume for simplicity that the flexibility on the labour market will 
ensure full employment and the supply of labour is normalized to unity so that  t   , 1 ∀ = t L .  
 
2.2 The behaviour of risk neutral entrepreneurs and iso-wealth curve 
Risk neutral entrepreneurs maximise their wealth in period t+1 in solving the following 
program:  
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where  ϕ  and γ  are Lagrangian multipliers associated with leverage and balance-sheet 
constraint respectively.  
First-order conditions (FOC) for entrepreneurs’ wealth maximisation are: 
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FOC (12) and (13) imply that the UIRP is verified, i.e.  
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Using FOC (12) to find the value of γ  and insert it into FOC (11) allows discussing 
entrepreneurs’ decision relative to leveraged financing. If  0 ) 1 ( 1
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the leverage constraint (4) is binding. In other words, when the marginal rate of return of 
domestic investment is superior to the cost of financing additional investment, entrepreneurs 
find it advantageous to invest in borrowing from abroad the maximal amount allowed by the 
leverage constraint. If  0 ) 1 ( 1
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αμ αμ α α , the constraint will not be binding and 
entrepreneurs will borrow less than that is authorised by the leverage multiplier. 
The parts of debt, denominated in domestic and foreign currency (or goods) respectively, 
cannot be determined without taking a more sophisticated approach of the behaviours of 
entrepreneurs and foreign banks under uncertainty and asymmetric information. For 
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This ratio can be the same for every period or be modified arbitrarily to examine the effect of 
its variation on economic equilibrium. In the following, current domestic-currency 
denominated foreign debt  t D  is simply named “foreign debt” even though the “total foreign 
debt” is a multiple of it, i.e.  t t t t t D vp F p D ) 1 ( + = + .   8
Foreign banks would pay attention to the wealth left to entrepreneur after the payment of 
principal and interests. If this financial indicator is zero or negative, no bank will lend to these 
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If 0 < t W , when international lenders reduce their lending to zero, they will lose money. All 
entrepreneurs will bankrupt and invest zero, i.e. the constraint (7) will be binding. For 
analytical purpose, we define an iso-wealth curve where entrepreneurs have the same level of 
wealth independently of the level of foreign debt. For a given wealth  0 W , equation (16) can be 
rewritten as: 
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Given the values of  1 − t p  and  t p , there is an positive relation between investment and foreign 
debt as shown in Figure 1, where on the horizontal axis is represented the foreign debt and on 
the vertical axis the investment. The iso-wealth curve shows the combinations of foreign debt 
and investment that ensure a constant wealth. 
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        Figure 1: Iso-wealth curve.  
 
A given combination of investment and foreign debt ( 0 I , 0 D ) can correspond to different 
levels of entrepreneurs’ wealth according to the values of exogenous variables and parameters 
such as 
*
t r , X, μ  and α . We note that a variation of λ  has no effect on the iso-wealth curve.   9
According to equation (17), the curve Iso-wealth (Figure 1) will rotate counter-clockwise to a 
position like the curve Iso-wealth bis corresponding to lower net wealth, 
'
0 W , if there is:  
-  an increase in 
*
t r  that reduces entrepreneurs’ wealth.  
-  a decrease in X, since this implies according to equation (3) a depreciation of the real 
exchange rate, decreasing the current value of domestic product but increasing the 
value of principal and interests on foreign debt.  
-  an increase in μ  that, in increasing demand for foreign goods, implies a depreciation 
of the real exchange rate and hence has similar effect as a decrease in X. 
However, an increase in α  has ambiguous effects on entrepreneurs’ wealth. It implies, on 
the one hand, an increased revenue accrued to capitalists, and on the other hand, a 
depreciation of the real exchange rate (due to higher productivity of existing capital and hence 
higher output, and higher part of revenue that is exported for given investment) which 
increases thus the value of foreign debt when measured in domestic currency. 
 
2.3. The reduced dynamic system 
The model has nine endogenous variables, i.e.  t y ,  t C ,  t I ,  t K ,  t r ,  t p ,  t W ,  t D  and  t F . It 
can be resolved in two steps. The first step consists to solve the reduced system of difference 
equations describing the evolution of  t p ,  t I   and  t D . In the second step, we can solve for  t F , 
t K ,  t y ,  t C ,  t r  and  t W , using market equilibrium condition, identities or behaviour equations. 
Substituting  t y  defined by equation (1) into equation (3), we obtain: 
X
I p p I
p t t t t
t
) 1 ( )] 1 )( 1 ( 1 [ 1 1 μ μ α
αμ αμ α − − − − −
=
−
− − .          (18) 
Given international interest rate, the highest level of investment, I ˆ , that is rational to 
realise at stationary state, corresponds to the one that equalizes the marginal productivity of 
capital and the financial opportunity cost of investing. At steady state where 
p p p p t t t = = = − + 1 1 ,  I I I t t = = −1 ,  D D D t t = = −1   and 
* *
1
* r r r t t = = − , taking account of 
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At intermediate levels of investment inferior to I ˆ , the leverage constraint will be binding. 
Since entrepreneurs are risk neutral and try to accumulate wealth as quickly as possible, 
investment dynamics is described by the binding leverage constraint (4). Using equations (1), 
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The dynamics of private foreign debt, which is equal to the country’s external debt in the 
present model, can be described equivalently by equation (9) or equation (10) if  0 = ee B . 
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Equations (18) and (20)-(22) allow describing the dynamic behaviours of price, 
investment and foreign debt. They are non-linear difference equations and cannot be solved 
explicitly. However, the static and dynamic properties of this reduced system can be studied 
with the help of phase diagram. 
       
3. Steady state 
 
3.1. The steady state of the reduced dynamic system 
The steady state equilibrium of the reduced dynamic system is defined by the vector (I , 
p  and D ) which checks simultaneously the following equations, resulting from equations  
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Given steady state level of investment, equation (23) determines the steady state real 
exchange rate. Equation (24) gives the combination of investment and foreign debt along the 
most rapid wealth accumulation path, limited by the condition (26). Equation (25) is the 
solvency constraint of entrepreneurs, which implies that the surplus of wealth over investment 
is equal to interest payments on foreign debt. Equation (25) can be substituted by its steady 
state equivalent resulting from equation (10), which is read as follows: in the absence of entry 
and exit of capital, the trade surplus must be equal to interest payments on foreign debt. Since 
the debt in this model is only foreign and contracted uniquely by entrepreneurs, their solvency 
constraint is then the same as the external solvency constraint of the economy.  
   
3.2. Static properties of the reduced system 
The system constituted of equations (23)-(25) can be decomposed into two sub-systems 
that can be solved separately. Substituting p given by equation (23) into equations (24) and 
(25) and rearranging the terms lead respectively to 
) 1 ( }
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where 
inv D  and 
ee D denote, at different levels of investment, the highest steady state debt 
compatible with leverage and external solvency constraint respectively. The effects of a 
variation of the real exchange rate on wealth and consequently on these two constraints are 
taken into account in these two equations. Equations (27) and (28) constitute a sub-system 
which can be solved to obtain the steady state values of investment and foreign debt. 
For each value of 
inv D , we can determine a “financeable” level of investment that would 
occur if the leverage constraint (4) was binding. It determines via the effect of investment on 
the real exchange rate, and hence on balance sheets, how much credit could be extended to 
domestic firms at maximum. Since risk neutral entrepreneurs use maximally the leveraged 
financing, equation (27) represents also the set of combinations of foreign debt and optimal 
investment that is financed partially by entrepreneurs’ wealth and partially by foreign debt for 
all  I I ˆ < .  
   I                            12
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                          Figure 2:  Steady state and multiple equilibria. 
 
According to equation (27), 
inv D  is positive for  [
~




I  and equal 
to zero for  0 = I  and  I I
~
= . Equation (28) implies that 
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ee D  and 
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at steady state can be examined through their difference calculated using equations (27) and 
(28) as follows:  
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For  id I I
~
< (respectively   id I I
~
=  or  id I I
~
> ), the level of foreign debt compatible with external 
equilibrium is superior (respectively equal or inferior) to the maximal foreign debt allowed by 
the leverage constraint. The level of investment  id I
~
corresponding to the crossing point of 
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Taking account of above discussion about the relative position of each curve, the curves 
inv D  and  
ee D  could be approximatively represented as in Figure 2.
6  
At high levels of I,  the leverage constraint (4) will not bind. Instead, investment is 
determined by equations (5) and (14) and consequently limited to I ˆ . According to condition 
(26) as well as that  I I
~ ˆ < ,
7 the dark thick curve representing the set of feasible combinations 
of debt and investment is constituted of two parts, i.e. a horizontal part and a parabolic one 
denoted by AB (i.e.,  I I ˆ = ) and OB (i.e., the dark part on the curve 
inv D ) respectively. At 
levels of investment inferior to I ˆ , it is optimal for risk neutral entrepreneurs to use fully the 
leverage effect since this is the most rapid path of wealth accumulation. At I ˆ , entrepreneurs 
may use a leverage inferior to  ) 1 ( λ + .  
The positions of the curves 
inv D  and 
ee D depend on the value of exogenous variables and 
parameters such as X, 
* r   μ , v and α  while their respective intersection points with vertical 
axis are unchanged. We remark that, whereas λ  is a determinant of 
inv D , it does not affect 
ee D . These two curves are pulled to the left, if   
-  X decreases, implying a depreciation of the real exchange rate. That will increase the 
value of foreign currency debt when measured in domestic currency. 
- 
* r  rises, increasing financial burden of foreign debt.  
-  μ  increases, leading to similar effect as a decrease in X.  
In effect, these changes in exogenous variables and parameters imply that the 
entrepreneurs’ wealth and the trade account surplus are reduced to levels that cannot anymore 
sustain the initial level of foreign debt and keep both leverage and external solvency 
constraints respected. 
An increase in v also shifts these curves to the left. However, it exercises its effects 
differently. In effect, it is equivalent to an increase of total foreign debt. To keep foreign debt 
at a constant level compatible with the leverage and external solvency constraints, both 
domestic and foreign currency debt must be reduced. In the case of a decrease in λ , it limits 
                                                 
6   Some simple simulation exercises (using for example  5 . 0 = α ,  5 . 0 = μ ,  3 = X ,  05 . 0
* = r ,  2 = v  and  2 = λ ) 
justify the form of curves drawn in this paper.   
7 It is easy to check, using the definitions of  I ˆ  and  I
~
 that  [] α α α α λ − −
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the foreign borrowing by entrepreneurs, but it does not affect the external solvency constraint 
which depends on the steady state trade surplus. 
We remark that a variation of α  has contradictory effects on the curves 
inv D  and 
ee D . It 
affects in an ambiguous manner the entrepreneurs’ wealth and hence the maximal amount of 
foreign debt which can be borrowed by them. It affects similarly the trade account and 
therefore the level of foreign debt sustainable by the trade surplus.
8 On the one hand, an 
increase in α  will raise the total revenue that can be distributed (due to positive effect on the 
production) and the part of national revenue being distributed to entrepreneurs. That increases 
the surplus of entrepreneurs’ revenue over investment and thus their capability to repay 
principal and interests on foreign debt. In other words, it decreases relatively workers’ 
consumption and importations and increases the trade surplus necessary to pay interests on 
foreign debt. On the other hand, an increase in α  implies a depreciation of the real exchange 
rate due to higher productivity of existing capital and hence larger output as well as larger part 
of output that can be exported. Due to this depreciation, the value of foreign currency debt 
increases in terms of domestic currency. Hence, total foreign debt becomes too high and must 
be reduced in order to be compatible with both leverage and external solvency constraints.  
We admit that the foreign debt is non negative, i.e.  0 ≥ + F p D ,  I ∀ . This condition 
translates the assumptions according to which entrepreneurs have objective of attaining 
wealthy statute in exploiting as quick as possible all domestic investment opportunities; and 
once this statute is obtained, they will not seek to increase further their wealth by spending the 
surplus of their revenue over the investment. Under the above condition, there are only two 
stationary equilibria (Figure 2). One corresponds to the point O, where investment and foreign 
debt are both zero. At this equilibrium, lenders do not believe that entrepreneurs have any 
collateral. Another equilibrium is the point A where foreign debt is zero and investment equal 
                                                 
8  Deriving 
inv D and 
ee D given respectively by equations (27) and (28) with respect to α  leads to  
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− − − − − = Π , which is positive if we assume the real exchange rate is always 
positive (see equation (23)). As the numerator has a positive first term and a negative second term, the net effect 
is ambiguous.   15
to I ˆ . At both equilibria, the equilibrium condition on domestic goods market and the external 
equilibrium condition  0 = ee B  are realized.  
In a two-period partial equilibrium analysis, Krugman has shown that there are three 
equilibria where investment is equal to financeable investment that depends on wealth and 
leveraged financing. Krugman outlines the following story about financial crisis: “a decline in 
capital inflows can adversely affect the balance sheets of domestic entrepreneurs, reducing 
their ability to borrow and hence further reducing capital inflows”. He imagines “a game in 
which lenders decide, in random order, how much credit to offer to successive domestic 
entrepreneurs. The offer of credit depends on what the lenders think will be the value of the 
borrower’s collateral. But because some debt is denominated in foreign goods, this value 
depends on the real exchange rate, and hence on the actual level of borrowing that takes place. 
A rational-expectations equilibrium of this game will be a set of self-confirming guesses—
that is, the expected level of investment implicit in the credit offers must match the actual 
level of investment that takes place given those offers”. 
A general equilibrium analysis of the steady state of the economy reveals that there are 
only two equilibria. The question is how the story of the financial crisis told above can be 
reinterpreted in terms of general equilibrium analysis. At aggregate level, the amount that 
entrepreneurs can borrow from international lenders to finance the investment depends on 
their wealth. The wealth of each individual entrepreneur depends on the level of such 
borrowing in the economy as a whole. Hence, we share the following basic point with 
Krugman: the borrowing of individual entrepreneur has a negative externality on the 
community, since the volume of capital inflow affects the terms of trade and hence the 
valuation of foreign-currency-denominated debt.  
 
3.3. Dynamic properties of stationary equilibrium  
 
The phase diagram represented in Figure 3 allows discussing the stability issue in an 
economy where entrepreneurs use foreign debt to finance their investment. At the right of the 
curve 
ee D , the external debt is too high in the sense that the trade surplus is not sufficient to 
pay interests on existing debt and the foreign debt keeps increasing due to current account 
deficit, vice versa. Under the line I ˆ  and the left of the curve 
inv D , as the foreign debt is 
inferior to the maximum authorised by international lenders, entrepreneurs’ wealth increases   16
and they can invest more and more. Above the line I ˆ  the investment is too high and has a rate 
of return inferior to that offered by international financial market. Consequently, investment 
must be reduced to increase the marginal rate of return of capital. Under the line I ˆ  and at the 
right of the curve 
inv D , the foreign debt is too high to satisfy the leverage constraint and the 
entrepreneurs’ wealth will be insufficient to sustain the past level of investment. Therefore, 
investment must be reduced. 
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  Figure 3:  Multiple equilibria and phase diagram. 
   
The equilibrium point A is stable. Meanwhile, the equilibrium point O is not stable since a 
small wealth is sufficient to start a wealth accumulating process which leads to higher and 
higher investment and foreign debt, leading the domestic economy finally to the equilibrium 
point A.    
A more detailed discussion, in distinguishing seven areas in Figure 3, allows us to 
understand better the underlying dynamics of investment and foreign debt.  
In area 1 (area ABO), bounded at the above by the line I ˆ  and at the right by 
inv D , the 
foreign debt is inferior to the limit fixed by leverage constraint and is compatible with 
external solvency constraint. In this area, risk neutral entrepreneurs tend to invest in using at 
maximum the leveraged financing so that they can enrich themselves as quickly as possible. It 
implies that the quickest dynamic path, i.e. the segment OB of the curve 
inv D , will be chosen 
by these entrepreneurs. They have the possibility to reduce progressively their foreign debt 
and invest with their own financial resources once I ˆ  is attained. While this path is possible, it 
is extremely fragile and can lead to financial crisis when the domestic economy is facing 
adverse external shocks or international lenders turn pessimistic about the perspectives of the   17
domestic economy. Entrepreneurs with risk aversion will choose a wealth-accumulating path 
in the interior of the area ABO.  
In area 2, delimited by the line I ˆ , the curve 
ee D  and the curve OB, the investment is 
limited by the leverage constraint but not by the external solvency constraint. If the 
combination of investment and foreign debt happens to be in this area, entrepreneurs are 
constrained to reduce investment in order to reduce foreign debt. The temporary equilibrium 
that will realise after adjustment of international lending can be more or less favourable, 
depending on the confidence of international lenders placed on these entrepreneurs and the 
perspectives of the domestic economy. The adjustment imposed by international lenders may 
not be coordinated. For a level of wealth  0 W , instead of reducing their lending to a level 
corresponding to a point such as C, international lenders with herd behaviour could reduce 
their lending to zero, diminishing hence the investment to a level equal to  0 W .
9 A jump from a 
situation of disequilibrium with high foreign debt to a temporary equilibrium without it 
becomes possible when the debt is short run. In other words, the foreign debt is a jumping 
variable (or non-predetermined) and can be adjusted freely.  
In area 3, which is at the right of the curve 
ee D  and under the line I ˆ , entrepreneurs have 
high foreign debt, exceeding the limit imposed by the leverage constraint as well as that by 
external solvency constraint. If the foreign debt is not too high, a quick reaction of 
international lenders will allow them to recover totally or most of their lending with interests. 
If they wait, the situation could deteriorate and lead to their loss while all entrepreneurs 
bankrupt. 
In area 4, above the line I ˆ  and bordered at the left by the curve 
inv D for  id I I
~
>  and the 
curve 
ee D  for  [
~
, ˆ ] id I I I ∈ , the investment is higher than I ˆ  and the foreign debt is higher than 
the highest level compatible with both leverage and external solvency constraints. Rational 
entrepreneurs will reduce their investment until I ˆ. The reaction of international lenders will 
depend on the initial level of foreign debt as well as that of wealth.  
In area 5, between curves 
inv D  and 
ee D  with  [
~
, ˆ ] id I I I ∈ , the investment is higher than I ˆ . 
The foreign debt is higher than the highest level compatible with the leverage constraint and 
                                                 
9  To the difference of Krugman (1999), not all firms will bankrupt and investment will not finally fall to zero in 
this general equilibrium analysis.  
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lower than that respecting the external solvency constraint. Rational entrepreneurs will reduce 
their investment until I ˆ. If they do not make this decision, they will be constrained by foreign 
lenders to reduce their investment after all. Since foreign debt is not excessively high and 
entrepreneurs’ wealth is large, a severe financial crisis is impossible.  
In area 6, between curves 
inv D  and 
ee D  with  id I I
~
> , the investment is higher than I ˆ  
while the foreign debt is lower than the highest level compatible with the leverage constraint 
but higher than that respecting the long term external solvency constraint. Rational 
entrepreneurs will reduce their investment until I ˆ as well as their debt. If they do not reduce 
their investment, the foreign debt will increase due to unpaid interests and that will not be 
allowed by rational and well-informed international lenders who take account of the external 
equilibrium condition of the small country.  
In area 7, delimited at the above by the curve 
ee D ,  [ ,
~
] d id I I I ∈ ∀  and at the right by the 
curve 
inv D  with  [
~
, ˆ ] id I I I ∈ , the investment is higher than I ˆ . The foreign debt is lower than 
the highest level compatible with both leverage and external solvency constraints. 
Entrepreneurs will reduce their investment and foreign debt until the equilibrium point A is 
attained. 
In the areas 1 and 7, the behaviour of this model is relatively uninteresting in terms of 
crisis probability. In the area 1, the economy has a high rate of return on investment and may 
find that adjustment of its capital stock is delayed by not having leverage constraint binding. 
In the area 7, reducing orderly both investment and foreign debt is optimal and feasible. An 
outburst of financial crisis is improbable since the wealth is sufficiently high with regard to 
existing foreign debt. In these two cases, there will be nothing that resembles an Asian-style 
financial crisis as discussed in the literature.  
The financial crisis in this model then cannot be explained by jumps between the multiple 
stationary equilibria due to self-fulfilling expectations. Meanwhile, they can be interpreted as 
jumps from a temporary equilibrium with high foreign debt to another one with less or no 
foreign debt, situated on two different dynamic trajectories. To make this possible, one can 
consider some factors that make foreign lenders panicking. In this respect, two channels of 
contagion, i.e. monsoonal effects and spill-over effects (Masson, 1999a, b), can be used here 
to explain a financial crisis. The monsoonal effects emanate from the global environment (in 
particular, from policies in industrial countries), and sweep over all emerging countries to a 
greater or lesser extent. An example is a monetary contraction in the world leading country,   19
raising thus the financial costs of investment for an indefinite horizon. Due to spill-over 
effects, crisis in one country may affect other emerging markets through the linkages 
operating through trade, economic activities or competitiveness. A typical example is a 
currency devaluation of a rival country in crisis, which reduces potentially the exportations of 
the domestic economy. 
Due to the effects of contagion, an economy initially on a feasible accumulation path such 
as OB in Figure 3 may be found to be situated at the right of the curve 
inv D  or at worst at the 
right of the curve 
ee D  as these curves shift to the left. For emerging economies that initially 
offer high rate of return of capital, this situation can result from previous choices of 
entrepreneurs who underestimate the effects of exogenous shocks on macroeconomic and 
financial stability and the repercussion of these shocks on the rate of return of their own 
investment.  
We remark that although the leveraged financing is assumed to have a rigid multiplierλ , 
international lenders can choose to reduce drastically the debt to a level that they consider as 
safe for their principal and interest payments, in particular when the debt is short-run. Under a 
flexible exchange regime, a severe reduction of investment and foreign debt in a short time 
can take place when some shocks modify drastically and adversely the current and future real 
exchange rates and hence reduce entrepreneurs’ wealth to a dangerous low level. 
Any temporary equilibrium along the line OB is submitted to the possibility that a loss of 
lenders’ confidence will be validated by financial collapse if these lenders change radically 
their behaviour. In normal time, domestic entrepreneurs could finance their investment in 
using at maximum the leveraged financing. But in bad time, panicking international lenders 
could reduce arbitrarily the leverage multiplier to level that they consider as safe. They would 
examine attentively if the exogenous shocks are sufficiently important so that the economy is 
going to collapse with investment and entrepreneurs’ wealth falling to zero. This scenario is 
possible only if investment and foreign debt are both jumping variables. If the investment is 
only amortised partially and the foreign debt is long term, the immediate collapse will be less 
severe and these two variables will be on a path of crawling crisis with less violence. 
 
4.  Factors at the origin of financial fragility and crisis 
 
It is largely documented that Asian countries, which have been drawn into 1997 financial 
crisis, had a balance of payments characterized by large current account deficits compensated   20
by net inflow of foreign capital. In our model, this could correspond to a situation where 
ambitious entrepreneurs expand their investment using at maximum the leveraged financing 
along or near the line OB. That implies an increasing inflow of foreign capital.  
Even the basic part of our model is the same as Krugman, the story that we will talk is 
quite different from his one. In fact, Krugman worked with three equilibria that are made 
possible in using a partial static equilibrium analysis. A financial crisis corresponds then to a 
jump from one equilibrium with high investment to another one with zero investment with all 
entrepreneurs bankrupt, given that an intermediate equilibrium is not stable.  
In this paper, a general equilibrium analysis shows there are only two steady state 
equilibria. Consequently, a financial crisis is an inherent phenomenon of an emerging market 
economy that uses extensively foreign debt (foreign currency denominated or not) to finance 
its development. It is a jump from one trajectory of wealth-accumulating to another one with 
less investment and lower foreign debt when international lenders become pessimistic. When 
a more or less severe financial crisis takes place, not all entrepreneurs are bankrupt 
systematically. The collapse (or shift from one dynamic trajectory of high debt to another one 
with low or no debt) does not indicate that the previous investments were unsound. The 
problem is instead one of financial fragility in a dynamic context. 
 
4.1. Factors at the origin of financial fragility 
The financial fragility in this kind of model has nothing to do with the mismatch between 
short-term debt and long-term investments; nor does it appear to depend on foreign exchange 
reserves. Krugman has highlighted the difference between his story of financial fragility and 
that told by others (e.g. Chang and Velasco, 2001) by considering the conditions under which 
this fragility can occur — namely, when financeable investment responds more than one to 
actual level of investment. That leads him to consider the following factors as being able to 
make financial collapse: (i) High leverage; (ii) Low marginal propensity to import; (iii) Large 
foreign-currency debt relative to exports.   
What is then the role of these factors in the present model? We examine in the following if 
they make the domestic economy more fragile and more likely to fall into financial crisis 
when facing adverse exogenous shocks or unfavourable change in international lenders’ 
opinion.  
 
High leverage     21
An increase in the leverage, i.e. higher λ , will shift the curve 
inv D  to the right without 
modifying the position of the curve 
ee D . Whatever is the value of λ , the curve 
inv D  is 
always at the left of the curve 
ee D  in the space of (D, I) for  I I ˆ < . But as the curve 
inv D  is 
closer to the curve 
ee D ,  I I ˆ < ∀ , a temporary equilibrium point like B’ in Figure 4 is less 
susceptible of keeping the confidence of international lenders than a point like B. In effect, if 
exogenous shocks come to shift the curve 
ee D  to the left, it is more probable to find the point 
B’ at the right of the new curve (not drawn in Figure 4) representing the external equilibrium 
condition. That corresponds to a situation where the external debt of the small economy is not 
sustainable given the economic and financial conditions. 
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                          Figure 4:  High leverage and steady state equilibrium. 
 
Low marginal propensity to import 
A decrease in marginal propensity to import will shift the curves 
inv D  and 
ee D  to the 
right with the later being more sensible (Figure 5). Since a low marginal propensity to import 
leads domestic entrepreneurs to contract higher foreign debt, it will increase the fragility of 
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                          Figure 5:  Low marginal propensity to import and steady state equilibrium. 
 
Large foreign-currency debt relative to exports 
The ratio of foreign-currency debt relative to exports is a complex indicator which is not 
clearly discussed by Krugman. In terms of static comparatives, a large ratio of foreign-
currency debt relative to exports can be due to multiple factors. Using equations (15), (23) and 
(27), the ratio can be written as: 
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An increase in v,  μ ,  λ  and α  as well as an decrease in 
* r  and  X  could lead domestic 
firms to contract a larger foreign currency debt, implying an increase in the ratio  X
pF .
10 A 
larger ratio  X
pF  will make these firms more vulnerable to financial crisis. The ratio depends 
also on the investment and hence the stage of economic development. It is to note that some 
parameters or exogenous variables, such as λ , 
* r  and  X , can vary adversely and brutally, 
leading to financial crisis as discussed in the following.  
 
4.2. Factors at the origin of a financial crisis 
The factors discussed above explain the fragility of emerging market economy using 
foreign debt to finance its development. They matter because they make the circular loop 
                                                 
10  If  I  is sufficiently high so that  0 ln > I , we have then       
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from past investment to real exchange rate to balance sheets to current investment more 
powerful. But they don’t explain why Asian financial crisis takes place. All afflicted Asian 
economies were peculiarly vulnerable to financial crisis due to high leverage and unusually 
high levels of debt denominated in foreign currency. These borrowings have placed them at 
risk of financial collapse if the real exchange rate depreciated. Before discussing the impact of 
a depreciation of the real exchange rate resulting from a devaluation of the domestic currency, 
we show that the factors that were present in Asian crisis can also generate a financial crisis 
under floating exchange rate regime. Generally, the factors leading to financial fragility can 
become factors at origins of financial crisis if they come to change adversely. Consider here 
some others not considered in the above discussion.  
 
Foreign monetary policy 
One important factor which is present previous to Asian financial crisis is the high 3-
month Libor interest rate (Kwack, 2000). In effect, previous to the crisis, the Fed has adopted 
a restrictive stance for its monetary policy, inducing hence higher interest on international 
financial markets. This shock can affect considerably the temporary equilibrium based on 
leveraged financing. According to equations (27) and (28), an increase in 
* r  shifts the line I ˆ  
to  ' ˆ I , and the curves 
inv D  and 
ee D  to the left (Figure 6).  
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                           Figure 6:  An increase in foreign interest rate. 
 
An increase in foreign interest rate reduces the foreign funds disposable for domestic 
entrepreneurs. Furthermore, this is unfavourable to their personal wealth for the following 
periods since they have to pay high interest rate, reducing thus their wealth from  0 W  to 
'
0 W . If   24
the net wealth is sufficiently high at the initial temporary equilibrium, the following 
adjustment can place the economy on a trajectory such as the curve OB’. In the contrary, the 
foreign debt can jump to a low level if it is short term or follow a trajectory characterized by 
crawling financial crisis if it is long term. 
 
Lender’s attitudes towards domestic entrepreneurs 
In the present model, the leverage of investment over entrepreneurs’ wealth is considered 
as fixed. When a financial crisis hits other emerging economies, lenders may change their 
mind and hence reduce the leverage multiplier. In this case, the curve 
inv D  shifts to the left, 
while the curve 
ee D  stays unmoved (Figure 7).  
A reduction in the leverage multiplier may translate an increased risk aversion or loss of 
confidence of international lenders on the future perspectives of the domestic economy or/and 
world economy. It is not sufficient to lead to the occurrence of a financial crisis except when 
their pessimistic expectations are realised. If entrepreneurs’ wealth is not influenced, 
investment and foreign debt will adjust orderly towards lower levels. 
   I                          
  I
~
    
                
inv D  
   d I                                                   
                          id I
~
                                               Iso-wealth 
                                               
                         I ˆ   A    B’       B                         
                                                         
ee D                            
                          0 W                                                           
                           
                          O                                                          D 
     Figure 7:  A decrease in the leverage multiplier. 
 
Contagious financial crisis 
A currency devaluation of a neighbour country that is competitor of the domestic county 
on the international goods market reduces the latter’s exportations.
11 That shifts the curves 
                                                 
11 We neglect the effect of neighbour country’s currency devaluation on the domestic price level. This can be 
justified by assuming that the domestic country produce similar goods than its neighbours but does not import 
goods from its neighbour country for consumption or investment.   25
inv D   and  
ee D  to the left and could make the initial temporary equilibrium with high 
investment and high foreign debt unsustainable judging by the leverage constraint and/or 
external equilibrium condition. If the leverage constraint is not respected meanwhile external 
solvency constraint is respected, the panic of lenders may be not very severe since the 
reduction of liquidity in the domestic economy will not bankrupt all entrepreneurs. In effect, a 
reduction of exportations will impact negatively the entrepreneurs’ wealth since it implies a 
depreciation of the real exchange rate and hence increases the value of foreign currency debt 
measured in domestic currency. A surprise decrease in exportations would make some 
domestic entrepreneurs insolvent and could lead to a financial crisis. The severity of the crisis 
depends on initial wealth, leverage multiplier as well as amplitude of the fall in exportations. 
Particularly, if the external solvency constraint is also violated, a deep crisis may 
materialize since the high level of debt may be backed by an insufficient level of wealth or 
even negative wealth. Consequently, the liquidation of all firms may not leave enough 
financial resources to pay all foreign debt and interests.  
 
5. The dilemma of stabilization under nominal exchange rate peg 
 
In the period before 1997, Asian countries have grown rapidly and liberalised their capital 
account as urged by the FMI while keeping nominal exchange rate peg. The peg of Asian 
monies to US dollar is an important characteristic that is not taken into account in the 
previous description of the model. Even the model does not include explicitly the money 
market to allow analysing monetary or exchange rate policies, we can however discuss the 
effect of a fixed nominal exchange rate on economic equilibrium and dynamics. If domestic 
and foreign inflation rates are equal, a fixed nominal exchange rate is equivalent to a fixed 
real exchange rate
12. The inflation rate is often higher in emerging economies, without 
excluding the contrary, than in their developed counterparts due to abundant inflow of foreign 
capital and liquidity. If this is the case, a fixed nominal exchange rate implies regular 
appreciation of the real exchange rate, i.e. a decrease in  p  relative to its value in previous 
period.  
 
Fixed real exchange rate 
                                                 
12 This is the case analysed by Krugman (1999).    26
To avoid the risks of financial trauma due to foreign currency debt was a major reason 
why the IMF advised its Asian client countries to follow the much-criticized “IMF strategy” 
which consists to defend their currencies with high interest rates rather than simply letting 
them devaluate. Even though this model does not allow a direct analysis of monetary policy, 
we can get some insight at the nature and consequences of the IMF strategy by imagining that 
the effect of that strategy is to hold the real exchange rate p  constant even when the 
willingness of international lenders to finance investment declines.  
Consider the case where domestic and foreign inflation rates are equal and real exchange 
rate is maintained fixed using nominal exchange rate peg. Since p is fixed, the natural 
assumption to ensure the equilibrium on domestic goods market, as adopted by Krugman, is 
that the output adjusts instead to the aggregate demand. Considering that  p  is exogenously 
controlled as fixed, the steady state output will be determined by a sort of quasi-Keynesian 
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The realised output is inferior or equal to the production capacity, i.e. 
α I y ≤ . Inserting the 
value of  y  defined by equation (33) to substitute the distributed national revenue, which is 
α I  under flexible exchange rate regime, in equations (24) and (25) yields: 
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The slope of the curve 
ee D  is clearly negative and that of the curve 







. The equilibrium determined by equations (34) and (35) is unstable
13 as 
illustrated in Figure 8. This equilibrium would be disqualified as sustainable steady state 
equilibrium if it is situated above the line I ˆ  (not represented in Figure 8).   
Above the line 
inv D , the investment is high and the foreign debt is relatively low. 
Entrepreneurs increase their investment and hence their wealth. At the right of the curve 
ee D , 
                                                 
13  The slope of the curve 
inv D  could be negative but that does not change the instability nature of the 
equilibrium.   27
the trade surplus is not sufficient to pay interests on the foreign debt, consequently the foreign 
debt will increase due to current account deficit. An increase in  p  induced by a devaluation 
of the domestic currency will impact both curves as follows: 
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The effects of an increase in  p  on 
inv D  depends on the level of investment while that on 
ee D  is always positive.  
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                          Figure 8:  Instability under fixed nominal and real exchange rates. 
The level of investment for which an increase in  p  has no effect on the curve 
inv D  is 
defined using (36) as  
v
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Using equations (34) and (35), the level of investment corresponding to initial equilibrium 
is defined as: 
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For the initial equilibrium A to situate at the right of the curve 
'
inv D , it is necessary that 
the investment corresponding to the rotation point of the curve 
inv D   is inferior to its initial 
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If the proportion of foreign currency debt relative to domestic currency debt is high enough, a 
devaluation of the national currency will increase the foreign debt to a level higher than what 
is authorized by the leverage constraint. 
If  v is sufficiently high, then a financial crisis is possible when exogenous factor has 
increased the equilibrium value of the real exchange rate. A speculative attack could then 
force the domestic country to abandon the nominal exchange rate peg, leading to higher 
nominal exchange rate, i.e. a devaluation of the national currency and a depreciation of the 
real exchange rate. This shifts the curve 
ee D to the right and makes rotate the curve 
inv D  
counter-clockwise around the point R (Figure 8). Even if the foreign debt is sustainable 
according to the external equilibrium condition, it is higher than that is authorised by the 
leverage constraint. The economy will not converge to the new equilibrium point B since a 
forced reduction of foreign debt will imply a smaller investment, which in its turn will reduce 
entrepreneurs’ wealth, and hence once again there will be a vicious feedback from actual to 
financeable investment, putting the economy on a path like AA’. 
Stabilizing the nominal and real exchange rates, while closing one channel for potential 
financial collapse, opens another: in increasing strongly domestic interest rate hence the 
interest rate paid to international lenders, the sustainable level of foreign debt is reduced 
drastically, especially when leverage is high. In the case of Thailand, given the overvaluation, 
Merton (1998) considers that one mistake of the government is not to take a once-and-for-all 
devaluation. Another mistake is to raise local interest rate since the interest rate parity 
theorem tells us that those speculators who have already sold short baht in the forward market 
will be enriched, not hurt. In the contrary, it can hurt entrepreneurs and hence precipitate a 
financial crisis.  
Following an increase in domestic interest rate (a risk premium could be added to 
* r  in 
equations (34) and (35)), the curves 
inv D  and 
ee D  both shift to the left for unchanged real 
exchange rate. As a result, the initial equilibrium A will be found in a zone where the foreign 
debt is not sustainable with decreasing wealth and hence investment must be reduced 
drastically along a path like AA’ (Figure 9). The economy may stabilize its real exchange rate 
only at the expense of a self-reinforcing decline in investment and output that produces an 
equivalent decapitation of the entrepreneurial class.   29
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Figure 9: Increasing domestic interest rate to keep real exchange rate unchanged. 
 
Decreasing real exchange rate 
We assume now that the price is perfectly flexible. Then, if the nominal exchange rate is 
fixed, it is the adjustment of the real exchange rate that ensures the equilibrium on the 
domestic goods market. This corresponds to a situation
14 where domestic inflation rate is 
higher than the foreign one and there is a regular appreciation of the real exchange rate, i.e. a 
decrease in  p  relative to its value at previous period. Denote the rate of appreciation of the 






1 . Using this and equations (21) and (22), we obtain:  
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The equilibrium described by equations (41) and (42) is not steady state since the real 
exchange rate present in these equations is changing from period to period. As the real cost of 
foreign debt is underestimated due to the regular appreciation of the real exchange rate, 
foreign debt continues to increase. Due to the wedge between domestic and foreign inflation 
rates and hence the appreciation of the real exchange rate,  t p  diminishes from period to 
period under the nominal exchange rate peg. This will pull the curves 
inv D  and  
ee D  more 
and more to the right (Figure 10). 
                                                 
14 This is empirically relevant. For example, according to Euh and Rhee (2007), the sharp increase in the 
domestic wage rate (real wages in Korea doubled between 1985 and 1995) and the over-valuation of the Korean 
won both encouraged Korean firms, which relied almost entirely on debt rather than equity, towards further 
international expansion and foreign borrowing.   30
If the inadequate nominal exchange rate is kept in place for too long time, the dynamic 
trajectory on which is situated the temporary equilibrium could be too far from the one which 
is compatible with the constraints represented by the curves 
inv D  and 
ee D , and which is 
viable when both price and nominal exchange rate are flexible. The growth is sustained by 
continuous expansion of investment and foreign debt. But, if the inflow of foreign capital is 
stopped and market participants anticipate a devaluation of the national currency, the fixed 
nominal exchange rate cannot be sustained due to foreign capital flight and abyssal trade 
deficit. In effect, the temporary equilibrium attained before the crisis could be faraway at the 
right of the curve 
inv D and eventually at the right of the curve 
ee D , violating then the 
leverage constraint and eventually the external equilibrium condition. Then, a lenders’ panic 
is possible.   
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Figure 10: Fixed nominal exchange rate and appreciation of the real exchange rate. 
 
 
6. Some policy implications 
 
Even the framework represents roughly the reality of Asian emerging market economies 
in the 1990s, some conclusions could be drawn from it for policy makers. We discuss in the 
following three questions asked by Krugman and underline the differences with his 
conclusions.  
 
Preventive measures against financial crisis   31
In the present model, the financial crisis is due to high foreign debt borrowed by 
entrepreneurs of animal spirits without aversion to risk.  
Krugman has argued that the widespread imposition of Chilean-type restrictions on short-
term borrowing denominated in foreign currencies, which reduces short-term foreign-
currency exposure, could not allow countries to reduce significantly the risks of being forced 
into crisis by a loss of confidence. In addition, as long as a country has free convertibility of 
capital, short-term foreign loans are only one of many different possible sources of capital 
flight. Our view is a little different, if only a small part of foreign loans are short term, foreign 
debt will not will be a totally free jumping variable and will not fall to zero whenever there is 
a financial crisis.  
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               Figure 11: The effect of contagious crisis with mixture of short and long term debt.  
Consider a contagious financial crisis in a competing country, which decreases the 
expected exportations of the domestic country in the future and hence shifts the curve 
inv D  as 
well as the curve 
ee D  (not represented in Figure 11) to the left, reducing the sustainable level 
of foreign loans and makes the iso-wealth curve rotate counter-clockwise around the point C 
attained before the financial crisis. The temporary equilibrium C is not any more sustainable. 
If short-term foreign debt is sufficiently important, the economy will jump along the new iso-
wealth curve to the point C’, or to another one down the curve Iso-wealth bis and at the left of 
the curve 
'
inv D . Then, the development of the economy continues along OB’ or another 
trajectory leading to higher investment and higher foreign debt in the future when the dust of 
financial panic has settled.  
After being affected by a contagious financial crisis, a temporary equilibrium could 
happen to be at the right of the curve 
'
inv D . A high level of long-term foreign debt implies   32
that the economy is on a trajectory of crawling crisis. Even though the rest of foreign currency 
debt is long term, the fact that the holders of short-term foreign debt will refuse to roll it over 
could generate an exchange rate depreciation that bankrupts some entrepreneurs until the 
foreign debt is sufficiently low (i.e. at left of the curve 
'
inv D ). However, higher rate of return 
of capital will allow entrepreneurs who have survived the crisis to regain the confidence of 
international lenders.  
Even though our analysis of the impact of the financial crisis is different from that of 
Krugman, we agree with his proposition about the appropriate prophylactic policy. To avoid 
any transmission of international crisis to the domestic economy, it is necessary to discourage 
firms from taking on foreign-currency-denominated debt of any maturity. In effect, the real-
exchange-rate impact of adverse shocks could negatively affect domestic investment in the 
presence of such borrowing. The negative effects are magnified to cause economic distress 
when such borrowing is high and when capital-market imperfections are important. In the 
absence of foreign currency debt (i.e.  0 = v ), a shock like a decrease of exportations will not 
modify 
inv D  as well as 
ee D  according to equations (27) and (28), but can impact negatively 
the wealth of the current period according to equation (8). If the shock is small, the current 
level of entrepreneurs’ wealth can stay above that of last period allowing international lenders 
to maintain the same level of lending for the following periods. In the contrary, these lenders 
will reduce lending to a level compatible with lower level of wealth. The adjustment could 
then be realised downside along the curve 
inv D . However, extreme shocks, such as a sudden 
decrease of exportations inducing an ample depreciation of the real exchange rate and a brutal 
decrease in output,
15 and hence a severe reduction of entrepreneurs’ wealth, can lead to a 
financial panic. 
In this framework, we can consider another measure to avoid the contagion by 
international financial crises, i.e., the government limits the leveraged financing used by 
domestic entrepreneurs. In diminishing the use of leveraged financing to a level (on a path at 
the left of OB in Figure 11) less than the leverage multiplier allowed initially by international 
lenders, the probability that these entrepreneurs become insolvent in the case of adverse 
shocks will be reduced.  
 
Policy during the financial crisis  
                                                 
15 The current stock of capital depends negatively on current real exchange rate.   33
We have analysed previously that let the exchange rate peg go or stabilize it are not 
solutions to avoid financial panic or to limit its effects on the domestic economy.   
The provision of emergency lines of credit must not be used to avoid the exchange crisis 
but to prevent the financial crisis that could result from it due to high level of foreign currency 
debt. This measure is justified if the level of investment before the crisis is less than I ˆ . 
However, due to changing international context, the foreign debt could become too high to 
satisfy the leverage constraint but is always compatible with external solvency constraint 
(point C in Figure 12, where the representation of 
ee D  is omitted).  
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Figure 12: The effect of contagious crisis and the IMF credit lines. 
In this model, it appears that these credit lines would have to do more than just provide 
balance-of-payments financing or even provide lender-of-last resort facilities to banks, but not 
to be used to defend the un-defendable nominal exchange rate peg. Keeping the temporary 
equilibrium at the point C while the anticipated depreciation of domestic currency (and hence 
that of the real exchange rate) indicates a possible temporary equilibrium at the left of (or on) 
the curve 
'
inv D  can consume much financial resources. To keep the level of investment 
corresponding to the point C, the IMF’s financial aid must be sufficient to make up the credit 
being lost by firms so as to allow investment to continue, given that some foreign lenders will 
reduce their lending. If the IMF funds are used to defend the nominal exchange rate peg, the 
aid must be large enough to substitute all private foreign lending desiring quitting the country 
at the official nominal exchange rate. The funds needed can be very important and surpass the 
financial capacity of an international institution like the IMF trying the same rescue measure 
with all countries simultaneously entering a financial crisis.   34
If the IMF credit lines are not used to defend the nominal exchange rate peg, a temporary 
equilibrium like the point C is defendable. Since the domestic currency is already depreciated, 
there is less or absence of incentive for capital flight, particularly when the IMF financial aid 
can be used, through a mechanism that funnels the funds to troubled entrepreneurs
16, to limit 
the bankruptcy due to lack of liquidity. If the IMF is credibly willing to help the country in 
crisis but without excess investment, a sufficiently large credit line would never actually have 
to be used, since its very existence would prevent the financial crisis from ever getting under 
way. Standstill agreements on foreign-currency debt negotiated with foreign lenders can 
greatly increase the efficacy of the IMF aid. Nevertheless, the exchange crisis is not easily 
avoidable if the capital convertibility is always in place. In Figure 12, the economy can pass 
from point C to point E when entrepreneurs reduce progressively their debt owed to the IMF. 
Consider the case where the initial high level of investment is based on weak international 
financing cost. An over-investment will result if the international interest rate has risen 
durably. In this case, an adjustment of investment is necessary. It is inevitable then to let some 
entrepreneurs bankrupt even it is urgent to rescue the others.  
Another measure to rule out the possibility of a downward financial spiral, which has been 
used by Malaysia during the 1997 crisis, is to impose a curfew on capital flight. It can be 
justified by the fact that standstill agreements on foreign-currency debt are not sufficient to 
avoid the twin crises. This measure can avoid the exchange rate crisis as well as the resulting 
financial crisis if capital-account convertibility is suspended so that any form of capital flight 
is not anymore possible. This measure is efficient only when the shock at the origin of these 
crises is transitory and the domestic investment is not too high when international economic 
and financial environment returns normal. It is then even in the self-interest of investors to 
impose emergency capital controls since not all investors can escape from the twin crises 
undamaged. However, if the adverse shocks are permanent, capital will find progressively 
other ways to quit the country and the curfew on capital flight will loss its efficacy.  
 
Rebuilding the economy after the financial crisis 
Krugman thought that the main problem, as his model (like many practitioners) suggests, 
was that the entrepreneurs who drove investment and growth before the crisis are now 
effectively bankrupt and unable to raise capital.  
                                                 
16 Generally, it is political difficult to justify the rescue of these entrepreneurs who are considered as culpable on 
the ground that their excesses brought on the crisis in the first place.   35
In our analysis, the solution depends on the initial levels of wealth and foreign currency 
debt of every individual entrepreneur. If the aggregate wealth of entrepreneurs after the 
devaluation of the domestic currency is high and little affected by the twin crises, many 
entrepreneurs can survive and reimburse their foreign debt and continue to develop in a 
context with less competition and higher profitability since the investment level is lower. 
Then, this will create a new wave of development soon after the twin crises. In this case, the 
efforts focused on bank restructuring and recapitalization are sufficient.  
Consider a second case where the aggregate wealth after the devaluation is near zero or 
negative, only some prudent entrepreneurs can survive and reimburse their foreign debt and 
develop more quickly with high profitability and weak competition since a majority of 
entrepreneurs have bankrupted. Even if a big wave of development can happen soon after the 
twin crises, the short-run deep economic recession is however too costly. Consequently, the 
efforts focused on bank restructuring and recapitalization are not sufficient. Solutions 
proposed by Krugman, such as rescuing bankrupt entrepreneurs through some kind of “private 
sector Brady Plan”, and/or growing a new set of entrepreneurs and/or welcoming foreign 
direct investment, are needed in order to diminish the economic and social consequences of 




This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium analysis of an extended version of the 
Krugman’s model with balance sheet effects in including notably the external solvency 
constraint of the small economy with domestic entrepreneurs indebted in foreign currency.   
We have found that, in assuming perfect mobility of capital, there is only two steady state 
equilibria, one without investment and foreign debt and another one with high investment and 
without foreign debt. There is not an intermediate equilibrium as that is the case in the paper 
of Krugman who has developed a two-period partial equilibrium analysis in ignoring the debt 
accumulation and the evolution of entrepreneurs’ wealth.  
In introducing the iso-wealth curve and external equilibrium condition beside the leverage 
constraint, we have shown how external shocks can impact the domestic economy and in 
which cases, these shocks combined with the collapse of nominal exchange rate peg can 
generate a financial crisis.    36
Our analysis also suggests that limiting foreign debt to a level inferior to the maximum 
allowed by international lenders can be an efficient preventive measure in increasing the 
resilience of the domestic economy in the presence of adverse shocks.  
Finally, we have argued that, when the twin crises happen, the race of domestic 
entrepreneurs is not always extinguished and the domestic economy could recover quickly 
after these crises. However, according to the severity of the financial crisis and its social and 
economic consequences, some measures such as rescuing bankrupt entrepreneurs, growing a 
new set of entrepreneurs and welcoming foreign direct investment could be necessary.  
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